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INTRODUCTION
A woman, who is a United States citizen, lives abroad with her
children and husband who is a foreign national. Her husband
constantly beats her, strangles her, and verbally assaults her alone and
in front of the children. Her husband has also started spanking the
oldest child on a nightly basis. Because she is not familiar with the
foreign legal system, she does not seek help or understand what she
needs to do in order to get help. To protect herself and her children,
she takes the children to the United States.
Traditionally, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction (hereinafter “Hague Convention” or
“Convention”), enacted in 1980, (also referred to as the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the name of the United States’
implementing statute) a court could return the children to the foreign
∗ J.D. Candidate and Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute
Resolution Candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. magna cum laude, May 2004, New York University, College of
Arts and Science. Jennifer S. Tier is deeply indebted to the following individuals for
their comprehensive input on this Comment: Professor Hal R. Morris, Julia R.
Lissner, Elisabeth S. Shellan, Daniel L. Snedigar, and Matthew W. McQuiston.
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country if the husband petitions a federal court.1 While the Hague
Convention does provide defenses to this remedy of returning the
children to the country of the petitioning parent, these do not explicitly
include a defense for cases of domestic violence.2 The most commonly
used defense in cases of domestic violence is Article 13(b) that states
the “remedy of return” is negated when there is a “grave risk of harm
to child.”3 Although this defense would seem adequate to cover cases
of domestic violence, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have traditionally
either rejected it altogether or altered what the Hague Convention
requires by interpreting it narrowly.4 In the past, circuit courts have
given the grave risk of harm defense an extremely narrow
interpretation.5 First, some circuit courts do not think that domestic
violence between parents constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child.6
Second, some circuit courts have reasoned that if the laws of the
child’s country of habitual residence will adequately protect the child,
courts should return the child, despite any domestic violence.7 Third,
some courts have reasoned that courts should attach conditions, such
as a restraining order, which will adequately protect the child when the
court returns the child to the country of habitual residence, mitigating
1

See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et al., 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague
Convention]; see also Nunez-Escudero v. Tice Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.
1995); Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 2000).
2
Hague Convention, supra note 1, Article 13(b).
3
Merle Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape From Domestic
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 651 (2000). [hereinafter Weiner I]
4
See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2001); Blondin v.
DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2001); March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472
(6th Cir. 2001); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); NunezEscudero, 58 F.3d at 377.
5
Jeremy D. Morley, Hague International Child Abduction Cases: The Future
of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense, THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, February, 2007
at 1.
6
See, e.g., March, 249 F.3d at 472; Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Tabacchi,
2000 WL 190576, at *13.
7
Miller, 240 F.3d at 402-03; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069.
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the grave risk of harm.8 Such conditions, or “undertakings,” are
arrangements or conditions placed upon the parties that make it
feasible to return the child to the country of habitual residence.9
Undertakings typically include restraining orders, payments of housing
and transportation costs, temporary custody arrangements, and other
safety requests.10 Using this legal analysis, the circuit courts have
narrowed the scope of the grave risk of harm defense, favoring to an
impermissible degree the integrity of the Hague Convention over
protection of individual children.11 Circuit courts have also violated
notions of international comity by specifically undermining the laws
of foreign countries when they evaluate the adequacy of those laws or
issue undertakings.12 “International comity encompasses the idea that
countries should interpret an international Convention that applies to
both of them so as not to undermine the other country’s law and
structure.”13
In December 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized in Van de Sande v. Van de Sande that spousal abuse and
child abuse constitute a grave risk of harm to the child.14 Despite the
historically narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm defense in
the United States, Van de Sande represents the growing trend among
some circuit courts to expand this defense.15 Specifically, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that nowhere does the Hague Convention indicate
that courts should analyze the laws of the country of the petitioning
8

See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069.
Roxanne Hoegger, What If She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the
Hague Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 188 (2003).
10
Id. at 189.
11
Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
12
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Hoegger, supra
note 9, at 202-03.
13
Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications of
Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 689 (2001).
14
See generally Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005).
15
Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
9
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parent to determine whether or not they provide adequate protection
for children in cases of domestic violence.16 Also, the Seventh Circuit
noted that undertakings might not be appropriate in cases of domestic
violence.17
This Comment contends that the Seventh Circuit correctly
analyzed and expanded the grave risk of harm defense in the context
of domestic violence. Section I will explain the provisions of the
Hague Convention and International Child Abduction Remedies Act.
Section II will discuss some of the problems with the remedy of return
under Hague Convention in cases of domestic violence. Section III
will address how several circuit courts have analyzed the grave risk of
harm defense. Section IV will explain the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Van de Sande v. Van de Sande. Section V will further discuss why
the Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted the Hague Convention and
expanded the grave risk of harm defense in cases of domestic violence.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES ACT
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act is the United
States statute which implements the international treaty entitled the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction.18 The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980, establishes
legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of wrongfully
removed or retained children, and secures the exercise of visitation
rights.19 For example, the Hague Convention entitles a parent whose
child has been abducted from a foreign country to the United States
(typically by a parent) to petition in federal court for the return of the
child.20 Specifically:

16

Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
Id.
18
Id. at 568.
19
42 U.S.C. §11601(a)(4) (2002).
20
Van De Sande, 431 F.3d at 568.
17
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The Hague Convention was created to discourage
abductions by parents who either lost, or would lose, a
custody contest. . . The Convention drafters adopted a
‘remedy of return’ . . . to discourage abductions,
reconnect children with their primary caretakers, and
locate each custody contest in the forum where most of
the relevant evidence existed.21
Framers of the Convention formulated it with the idea that
custody issues should be decided by the country of the child’s habitual
residence, not the country to which a parent has abducted the child.22
Courts are to promptly return children, whose parent wrongfully
removed or retained them within the meaning of the Convention,
unless one of the narrow defenses under the Convention applies.23
According to the remedy of return (also known as the ‘return
principle’), the receiving country should promptly return the child to
the country of habitual residence for adjudication of the custody
matter.24 The remedy of return is the preferred response to
international child abductions.25 Also, a Hague Convention proceeding
is not meant to be used as a trial to determine custody, but instead to
merely determine which country would have jurisdiction over any
pending custody disputes.26
Two defenses to the remedy of return are Articles 12 and 13(b),
both of which must be established using clear and convincing
evidence.27 Under Article 12 of the Convention, for example, a court
need not return a child if one year has elapsed since the wrongful
21

Id. (citing Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and
Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 275,
278-79 (2002)) [hereinafter Weiner II].
22
Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
23
42 U.S.C. §11601(a)(4).
24
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 186.
25
Id.
26
Morley, supra note 5, at 2.
27
42 U.S.C. §11603 (e)(2)(A) (2002).
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removal or retention and the child is now settled in his or her new
environment.28 In addition, a country is not required to return the child
if the person seeking the child’s return “was not actually exercising the
custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to
or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.”29 Article
13(b) of the Convention states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the
requested State is not bound to order the return of the
child if the person, institution, or other body which
opposes its return establishes that (b) there is a grave
risk of harm that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation.30
II. HOW THE HAGUE CONVENTION FALLS SHORT
IN DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES
The structure of the Hague Convention and the preference for the
principle of return have led to inadequate protections for victims of
domestic violence.31 The Hague Convention provides no explicit
defense that allows abduction if it occurs to escape from domestic
violence.32 Further, courts have generally not interpreted the
Convention’s current defenses (particularly the grave risk of harm
defense) to prevent the remedy of return in the case of a mother’s
flight from domestic violence.33 Also, the court of the country where
the child is abducted to retains discretion to return the child to the

28

Weiner I, supra note 3, at 650.
Id.
30
Hague Convention, supra note 1, Art. 13(b).
31
See generally Weiner I, supra note 3.
32
Id. at 599.
33
Id. at 651.
29

709
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/10

6

Tier: Domestic Violence Harms the Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts Child

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

country of habitual residence, even when one of the defenses under the
convention is asserted.34
First, the Explanatory Report of the Convention, which courts are
to give weight to when interpreting the Convention, asserts that
defenses to the remedy of return, including the grave risk of harm
defense, should be narrowly interpreted to prevent the “collapse of the
entire structure of the convention.”35 Specifically, Paragraph 34 of the
Explanatory Report states:
[T]he three types of exception to the rule concerning
the return of the child must be applied only so far as
they go and no further . . . [A] systematic invocation of
the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by
the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would
lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the
Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual
confidence which is its inspiration.36
The U.S. Department of State, in a report prepared for the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, also confirms that courts should
narrowly interpret the grave risk of harm defense.37 The report states,
“any exceptions had to be drawn narrowly lest their application
undermine the express purposes of the Convention—to affect the
prompt return of abducted children.”38 The report also states, “it was
generally believed that courts would understand and fulfill the
objectives of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the

34

See Feders v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995); see also
Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Iowa Civ.
2003).
35
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986); Morley, supra note 5, at 2.
36
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986).
37
Id.
38
Id.
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exceptions.”39 Finally, the State Department cautioned courts that the
grave risk of harm defense “was not intended to be used by defendants
as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests.”40
Second, the Convention itself seems to have a particular
stereotype of the kinds of international kidnappings that occur.41 In
particular, the drafters of the Hague Convention assumed that
international child abduction almost always harmed to children.42 The
drafters assumed that the abductors were non-custodial parents,
sometimes abusive, who kidnapped the child because they thought
they were going to lose custody.43 During the 1986 proceedings for the
ratification of the Hague Convention in the United States,
Congressmen told many real-life stories to illustrate the danger of
international child abduction.44 All of the cases cited involved
abductions by male non-custodial parents and a “deprived parent in the
United States.”45 An identical stereotype also helped secure the
passing of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the
implementing legislation of the Hague Convention in the United
States, in 1988.46
While the remedy of return works well if the abductor is a noncustodial parent, it is ineffective and inappropriate when the abductor
is the primary caretaker who flees because of domestic violence.47 In
such a case “the remedy of return puts the victim’s most precious
possession, her child, in close proximity to her batterer either without
39

Id.
Id.
41
Weiner I, supra note 3, at 603.
42
Id. at 616.
43
Id. at 617.
44
Id. at 602. (Senator Dixon told the story of Patricia Rousch whose two
daughters were kidnapped by their father, a Saudi national, even though she had
legal custody of the children. Senator Gore spoke of Holly Planells, a woman whose
son was taken by her ex-husband to Jordan, even though she had full legal custody
and the judge had imposed restrictions on the father’s weekend visitation).
45
Id. at 603.
46
Id.
47
Weiner II, supra note 21, at 278-79.
40
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her protection (assuming she does not return with the child), or with
her protection, thereby exposing her to further violence.”48
III. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a case
on the implications of domestic violence under the International Child
Abductions Remedies Act, the United States Court of Appeals have
taken several different approaches to the issue.49 The circuit courts,
until approximately 2000, traditionally followed the approach
advocating courts narrowly interpret the grave risk of harm defense,
often holding that domestic violence does not constitute a grave risk of
harm.50 Specifically, some circuit courts have narrowed the grave risk
of harm defense by requiring courts to evaluate the custody laws of the
country of habitual residence and requiring courts to analyze whether
undertakings can mitigate any grave risk of harm.51 Some circuits have
also limited the grave risk of harm defense to a very narrow set of
facts, such as circumstances in which the children suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder.52
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nunez-Escudero v. TiceMenley, held that there was not a grave risk of harm to the child,
although the mother alleged that she had been “physically, sexually
and verbally abused” and that she was “treated as a prisoner” by her

48

Id.
See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001); Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d
374 (8th Cir. 1995).
50
See, e.g., March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2001); NunezEscudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576,
at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000).
51
See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163; Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 403 (4th
Cir. 2001); Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069, Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377-78;
Tabacchi, 2000 WL 190576, at *15.
52
See generally Blondin, 238 F.3d at 153.
49
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husband and father-in-law.53 The mother (“Tice-Menley”) also stated
that she feared for her baby’s safety because her husband and
husband’s family objected to her nursing the baby, and the husband
refused to buy a baby seat for the car.54 The court noted that most of
the evidence presented concerned problems between Tice-Menley and
her husband and father-in-law; thus, the evidence was not specific
enough for the court to rule that there was a grave risk of harm to the
child.55 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court in
order to consider “information relating to the social background of the
child,” specifically the environment in which the child would reside
upon returning to his habitual residence.56 The court, however,
instructed the district court not to “consider evidence relevant to the
custody or the best interests of the child.”57 The court also noted that
Tice-Menley must prove by clear and convincing evidence that return
of the child to Mexico, the habitual residence, would subject him to a
“grave risk of harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable
situation.”58
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit seemed to reject the notion that
domestic violence directed towards a spouse constitutes a grave risk of
harm to the child; thus, the grave risk of harm defense would fail in
situations of spousal abuse.59 The Eighth Circuit also espoused the
notion that courts should look to the laws in the country of habitual
residence and what social institutions are in place, if the court returns
the child to his/her habitual residence.60 Accordingly, if a country has
proper laws and social institutions in place, these laws and institutions

53

Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d 374 at 376.
Id.
55
Id. at 377.
56
Id. at 378.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 377.
60
Id.
54
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mitigate the grave risk of harm to the child due to abuse of the mother
or child.61
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that the grave risk of
harm defense only exists in two very narrow circumstances.62 First,
there is a grave risk of harm when return puts the child in imminent
danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute, such as returning
the child to a “zone of war, famine, or disease.”63 Second, there is a
grave risk of harm in cases of “serious abuse or neglect, or
extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of
habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling
to give the child adequate protection.”64 The Sixth Circuit decided in
the case of Friedrich v. Friedrich that there was not a grave risk of
harm to the child because the mother’s only claim was that the child
would have adjustment problems if returned to the habitual
residence.65 The mother did not allege abuse on the part of her
husband.66 Several circuit courts have commonly utilized the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning in Friedrich regarding what constitutes grave risk
of harm to the child.67 Specifically, U.S. courts traditionally tended to
look at the child protection and spousal protection laws of the country
of habitual residence to determine if those laws provide adequate
protection to the child, thereby negating any grave risk of harm.68
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals actually held in the case of
Blondin v. DuBois that there was a grave risk of harm to the child, but
it seemed to limit its holding solely to the facts of the case at hand.69 In
61

Id.
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1067.
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2001); Miller v.
Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2001); March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th
Cir. 2001).
68
See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 162-63; Miller, 240 F.3d at 403; March, 249
F.3d at 472.
69
Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163.
62
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Blondin, the father had repeatedly abused the wife and the children, so
the wife took the two children from their habitual residence in France
to the United States.70 When the father learned that the mother had
taken the children, he instituted proceedings in the district court
seeking return of the children to France under the Hague
Convention.71 During the first proceeding in the district court, the
mother prevailed on her grave risk of harm defense.72 However, the
Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and
remanded the cause for further proceedings.73 The court did not
question the trial court’s findings regarding the history of abuse, but
held that further proceedings were required to determine whether “any
arrangements might be made that would mitigate the risk of harm to
the children, thereby enabling them safely to return to France.”74 On
remand, the district court found that there was still a grave risk of
harm to the children even though the father and French government
had agreed to certain undertakings.75 Specifically, the father agreed to
assist the mother and children financially in moving back to France
and agreed not to make contact with them prior to the judicial
determination on custodial rights, and the French government agreed
that it would not prosecute the mother for abduction.76 Specifically, the
district court found that any arrangements would fail to mitigate the
grave risk of harm to the children because returning the children to
France under any circumstances would cause them psychological
harm, as France was the scene of their trauma.77 During trial, an
uncontested expert testified that the children would suffer from post-

70

Id. at 156.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 157.
71
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traumatic stress disorder just from the act of returning to live in
France.78
Finally, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000 recognized a
grave risk of harm defense in cases of domestic violence.79 In Walsh v.
Walsh, the court held that there was a valid grave risk of harm defense
due to an abusive and violent husband; thus, the court would not return
the children to Ireland.80 The circuit court reversed the decision of the
district court because of several “fundamental errors.”81 First, the court
reasoned that the district court “inappropriately discounted the grave
risk of physical and psychological harm to children in cases of spousal
abuse.”82 The circuit court also noted that the district court failed to
take into account the husband’s “generalized pattern of violence,”
(including violence that had been directed towards his children from a
previous relationship) and the husband’s “chronic disobedience of
court orders.”83 The court reasoned that spousal abuse causes physical
and psychological harm to the children as recognized by social science
literature, and state and federal law.84 The court also noted although
Ireland had adequate protection laws, those laws would not prevent
abuse because it was unlikely that the husband would follow them.85
Finally, the court looked at the possibility of undertakings as a way to
mitigate the grave risk of harm, yet reasoned that undertakings would
also be ineffective because of the unlikelihood that the husband would
adhere to them.86
The court finally noted that they did not come to “this conclusion
lightly.”87 The court recognized that international child abduction is a
78

Id.
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000).
80
Id. at 221.
81
Id. at 219.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 220.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 221.
87
Id.
79
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serious problem and that in most cases Hague Convention petitions
result in the return of the children to the country of habitual
residence.88 However, the Hague Convention provides for certain
“limited exceptions [defenses]” to the general principle of returning
the child to the country of habitual residence and the court reasoned
the Walsh case demonstrated such a defense.89 Specifically, the grave
risk of harm defense applied to the Walsh case because of the
husband’s flight after an indictment for threatening to kill another
person and a long and documented history of violence and disregard of
court orders, which, as the court stated, went “well beyond what one
usually encounters even in bitter divorce and custody contexts.”90
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN VAN DE SANDE V. VAN DE SANDE
A. Introduction to Seventh Circuit’s decision
The case of Van de Sande v. Van de Sande is a perfect example of
when the remedy of return is inappropriate, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals properly recognized this limitation within the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act.91Also, the Seventh
Circuit deviated from the reasoning of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits
and is more willing to accept the notion that domestic violence
constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child.92 Specifically, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the jurisprudence courts should analyze the child
protection laws of the habitual residence to determine if there is a
grave risk of harm to child.93 The Seventh Circuit also questioned the
remedy of undertakings, conditions placed on the alleged abusive
88

Id. at 222.
Id.
90
Id.
91
See Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2005);
Weiner II, supra note 21, at 278-79.
92
See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570; see also Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d
153, 153 (2d Cir. 2005); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1060 (6th Cir. 1996);
Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
93
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
89
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parent that would still enable the court to return the child to the
habitual residence despite a finding of grave risk of harm.94 The
Seventh Circuit’s decision represents a shift in American jurisprudence
under the Hague Convention whereby courts more broadly interpret
the grave risk of harm defense.95
B. The facts and district court decision
Jennifer and Davy Van de Sande had two children, and were a
married but estranged couple, and habitual residents of Belgium,
Davy’s native country.96 A Belgian court awarded Davy custody of his
two children through an ex parte decree.97 Jennifer, who was living
with the children in the United States, refused to send them back to
Belgium.98 Davy filed a lawsuit under the Hague Convention in order
to have the two children returned to Belgium.99 Before the district
court, Jennifer raised a grave risk of harm to the children defense.100 In
support of this defense, Jennifer presented six affidavits, all claiming
that Davy abused Jennifer and their older daughter.101 According to the
affidavits, Davy began beating Jennifer in 1999.102 The beatings
typically consisted of choking Jennifer, throwing her against a wall,
and kicking her shins.103 The abuse occurred several times a week
throughout the marriage, including when Jennifer was pregnant, and
before and after their move to Belgium.104 Also, according to the
affidavits, Davy’s mother joined in the beatings of her daughter-in94

Id. at 571-72.
Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
96
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 569.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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law.105 Jennifer complained to the Belgian police, but they said they
could not do anything unless she went to a doctor to verify her
injuries—which she did not do.106 Davy often beat Jennifer in the
presence of the two children, causing them to cry.107 Davy also
verbally abused Jennifer in the children’s presence, calling her a
“cunt,” “whore,” “lazy fucking bitch,” and “lazy fat bitch.”108 Davy
told the daughter “fuck mommy” and “Tell [sic] Mommy [sic] she’s a
cunt.”109
Davy also began physically abusing his daughter when she started
wetting her bed.110 He would spank her, and he struck her in the side
of her head on one occasion.111 Davy’s mother also struck the daughter
in the head at least twice.112 In 2004, during a visit to Jennifer’s
parents in the United States, Jennifer told Davy that she and the
children would not be returning to Belgium.113 In response, Davy
threatened to kill both her and the children.114 Jennifer told her father
about Davy’s threats, the police were called, and an officer escorted
Davy from Jennifer’s parents’ house.115
Despite these affidavits, the district court granted summary
judgment for Davy primarily on the ground that there was no
indication that the Belgian legal system could not or would not protect
the children.116 The court was also influenced by the fact that most of
the physical and verbal abuse was directed at Jennifer, rather than the

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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Id.
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children.117 Specifically, there was no accusations the Davy beat the
younger boy, and the girl, although spanked and hit repeatedly, was
not injured.118 Also, no expert evidence of the psychological effect of
Davy’s conduct on either child was presented.119 The district court
ordered the return of the children to Belgium.120 The only undertaking
the judge inserted into the order was that Davy was to pay for their
airfare to Belgium.121 The Seventh Circuit Court, however, reversed
the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further
hearings.122
C. The Seventh Circuit’s decision
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized that the
remedy of return under the Hague Convention is problematic in cases
where the abductor is the primary caretaker and a victim of domestic
violence.123 The court reasoned that, assuming the affidavits submitted
by Jennifer were accurate (which the court must assume because Davy
filed the Motion for Summary Judgment), Jennifer satisfied the
statutory requirement that evidence of risk of harm to the children be
clear and convincing.124
The Seventh Circuit then rejected the district court’s analysis that
the Hague Convention is just a venue statute, designed to deter parents
from international forum shopping in custody cases.125 The Seventh
Circuit also rejected the district court’s reasoning that courts should
look to whether the child’s habitual residence has adequate child

117

Id. at 570.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 569.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 572.
123
Id. at 569.
124
Id. at 570.
125
Id.
118
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protection laws.126 The court rejected this interpretation of the Hague
Convention for several reasons.127 First, the court noted that there is a
difference between “the law on the books and law as it is actually
applied.”128 In particular, in domestic relations cases, abuse of children
can often go undetected.129 The court argued that “to give a father
custody of children who are at a great risk of harm from him, on the
ground that they will be protected by the police of the father’s country,
would be to act on an unrealistic premise.”130 Also, the court reasoned
that nowhere in the Hague Convention or the language of the
implementing statutes does it mention analyzing whether the laws of
the petitioning parent’s country are good or whether such laws are
zealously enforced; therefore, courts are going beyond the express
language of the Convention.131
Further, the court analyzed whether return with undertakings
would be a more appropriate order.132 The court, however, had several
concerns regarding the ordering of undertakings.133 First, the court was
concerned that because the custody case was still pending in Belgium,
the Belgian court would place the children in the care of a third party
(or foster care) until the issue of custody was resolved by the Belgian
courts.134 Instead of remaining in their mother’s custody in the United
States, the Belgian court might place the children in a foster care
institution, even though there was no suggestion that their mother was
abusive, neglectful, or an otherwise unfit parent.135 The Seventh
Circuit recognized that “return plus conditions (undertakings) could in
many cases “properly accommodate the interest in the child’s welfare
126

Id.
Id. at 571.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 571-72.
134
Id. at 571.
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Id.
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to the interests of the country of the child’s habitual residence.”136
Further, courts and parents can more easily find evidence concerning a
grave risk of harm in the country of habitual residence.137 The court
also recognized that it may be more difficult and costly for the nonabductor parent to prepare and present a court case in the country to
which the abductor has fled.138 The court, however, did not seem
persuaded by these arguments.139 The Court noted that in the case of
child abuse, “the balance may shift against [the] return plus conditions
[remedy].”140 According to the Seventh Circuit, the problem with
extensive undertakings is that such a practice would embroil the court
in the merits of the underlying custody issues—something the Hague
Convention specifically states that courts should not do.141 Also, the
court reasoned that undertakings are effective to preserve the status
quo, but that is not the goal when there is evidence that the status quo
is an abusive situation.142
Finally, the court noted that while concern with comity among
nations argues for narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm
defense, “the safety of children is paramount.”143 The court then
ordered that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing, since
Jennifer had presented sufficient evidence of a grave risk of harm to
her children.144
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Id. at 571-72.
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V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS
THE GRAVE RISK OF HARM DEFENSE
The Seventh Circuit has grasped what the Sixth and Eighth circuit
courts have failed to—“while concern with comity among nations
argues for narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm defense . . .
the safety of children is paramount.”145 Other circuit courts have
created barriers to the grave risk of harm defense to the remedy of
return in the case of domestic violence, while the Seventh Circuit is
more willing to accept such a defense.146 Further, the Seventh Circuit
recognizes the problems that have developed with regard to the
remedy of return in cases of spousal abuse under the Hague
Convention.147 Also, the court went further than other circuit courts in
finding a valid grave risk of harm defense specifically by rejecting
jurisprudence advocating courts analyze the laws of the country of
habitual residence and issue undertakings to mitigate any grave risk of
harm.148 The Seventh Circuit’s decision represents a general shift in
Hague Convention jurisprudence by expanding the grave risk of harm
defense to include cases of spousal abuse.149 The Seventh Circuit also
preserved notions of international comity by rejecting the legal
jurisprudence of courts analyzing of foreign country’s child protection
laws and issuing undertakings.150
By expanding the scope of the grave risk of harm defense,
American courts may have to focus more on the child’s physical and
psychological well-being in Hague Convention cases, which some

145

Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 20005); Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d
374 (8th Cir. 1995); but see Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572.
147
See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567.
148
See generally id.; see also Blondin, 238 F.3d at 153; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at
1060; Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 374.
149
Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
150
See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286
F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2002).
146
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circuit courts view as an impermissible custody evaluation.151 As one
commentator noted, “[There is a] notion that the integrity of the
Convention as a whole requires that the well-being of individual
children in hard cases must be sacrificed for the greater good of
maintaining the integrity of the Hague Convention process.”152 The
Seventh Circuit has rejected that notion.153
A. Spousal abuse constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child.
First, the Seventh Circuit accepted the notion that spousal abuse
harms the child.154 Unlike, the Eighth Circuit that rejected the notion
that spousal abuse could lead to a grave risk of harm to the child, the
Seventh Circuit accepted that although there may not be evidence that
a spouse-abuser abused the children, there is still a grave risk of
harm.155 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit seems to think that spouse-onspouse violence has no effect on the children, considering its holding
that there was no grave risk of harm to the children when the father
and father-in-law abused the mother.156 However, as the First Circuit
noted “credible social science literature establishes that serial spousal
abusers are also likely to be child abusers.”157 The First Circuit also
noted that both state and federal law have recognized that children are
at increased risk of physical and psychological injury then they are in
151

Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202.
Id.
153
See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567.
154
Id. at 570.
155
See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567; see also Nunez-Escudero v.
Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
156
See Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; see also, Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99
C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb, 10, 2000) (where although the
husband abused his wife there was no grave risk of harm to the child); March v.
Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2001) (where the court found that there was no
grave risk of harm to the children although there was a default judgment in a
wrongful death action against the husband after the disappearance of the wife
because there was only a “tenuous inference” that he might hurt the children).
157
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000).
152
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contact with a spousal abuser.158 Specifically, in a congressional
resolution passed in 1990, the House of Representatives found that:
“Whereas the effects of physical abuse of a spouse on children include
. . . the potential for future harm where contact with the batterer
continues; whereas children often become targets of physical abuse
themselves or are injured when they attempt to intervene on behalf of
a parent.”159 The Seventh Circuit has agreed with the analysis of the
First Circuit in Walsh; spousal abuse likely causes physical and
psychological harm to the children.160 By recognizing that spousal
abuse harms the child, the Seventh Circuit expanded the grave risk of
harm defense.161
B. Courts should not analyze the laws of foreign countries.
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the legal jurisprudence
instructing courts to look at the laws of the country of habitual
residence and the enforcement of those laws to determine if there is a
grave risk of harm to the child.162 The Sixth, Eighth, and Second
Circuits have held that even in cases of spousal or child abuse, a valid
grave risk of harm defense can be mitigated and the remedy of return
still applied if the laws of the country of habitual residence are
adequate to protect the child.163 The Seventh Circuit, however,
extended the reasoning in Walsh that courts should not look to the
158

Id.
H.R. CON. RES. 172, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted).
160
See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570-71; see also Walsh, 221 F.3d at 220.
161
See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570-71; Morley, supra note 5, at 6-7.
162
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
163
See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001);
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. TiceMenley, 58 F.3d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d
392, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (where the court noted that it was confident that if the
mother truly posed a danger to the children, the Ontario courts would adequately
protect them); Tabacchi, 2000 WL 190576, at *15 (where the court noted that the
mother failed to demonstrate that the Italian authorities would not adequately protect
her and the child).
159
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adequacy of the laws of the petitioning parent’s country.164 In Walsh,
the court implied that it was irrelevant whether the laws of the
petitioning parent’s country were adequate.165 The court specifically
stated, “[w]e have no doubt that the Irish courts would issue
appropriate protective orders. That is not the issue. The issue is John’s
[the husband] history of violating orders issued by any court, Irish or
American.”166
The Seventh Circuit extended this reasoning to conclude that
courts should not look to the adequacy of a foreign country’s laws.167
The Seventh Circuit correctly noted that nowhere in the Hague
Convention does it state that courts should analyze the laws of
different countries to determine their adequacy.168 Further, just because
a country may have adequate laws or even adequately enforce those
laws does not mean that the grave risk of harm to the child will be
mitigated.169 Most importantly, having United States courts evaluate
the laws of other countries in Hague proceedings completely
undermines the notion of comity, one of the primary goals of the
Convention.170
First, countries may have adequate law-on-the-books, but
ineffective law enforcement or inadequate implementation of the
laws.171 It is extremely difficult to measure to what extent law
enforcement may or may not enforce particular laws or what common
practices are in foreign countries.172 Also, because the abused spouse
is not from the children’s country of habitual residence she may not be
able to access the legal remedies available to her because she is

164

Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 221.
See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 221.
166
Id.
167
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202.
171
Weiner I, supra note 3, at 624-25.
172
See id.
165
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unfamiliar with the foreign legal system or because she may not speak
the language.173
Second, although a country may have adequate laws that may be
adequately enforced, it does not follow that an abusive parent or
spouse will follow those laws.174 If a court finds there is a grave risk of
harm, the harm cannot be mitigated even if a foreign country has
adequate laws to protect the child or punish the abuser.175 Just because
a parent may be adequately punished for domestic violence does not
mean that the grave risk of harm to the child is mitigated, because if
returned to the country of habitual residence a child will still be
physically or psychologically harmed.176 The harm cannot be negated
by adequate punishment after-the-fact.177
Finally, when American courts conduct an analysis of another
country’s laws or enforcement of those laws it goes against notions of
international comity.178 Specifically, if an American court determines
that there is grave risk of harm to the child after analyzing the habitual
country’s child custody laws, the American courts are sending the
message that the laws of the country of habitual residence are “bad.”179
To preserve notions of international comity under the Hague
Convention, courts should not pass judgment on the structure of
foreign country’s family policy because to do so would undermine the
laws of those countries.180 If courts ignore notions of comity, there is
also a danger that courts will become “culturally imperialist.”181 For
example, judges may send children and battered women back to
countries that have similar cultural customs concerning the treatment

173

Id. at 625.
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 203.
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of women and children, but refuse to implement the remedy of return
when the country of habitual residence is culturally dissimilar.182
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Sixth, Second, and Eighth
circuits’ reasoning that in order to determine whether or not there is a
grave risk of harm to the child courts need to look at the adequacy of
the laws of the country of habitual residence.183 By rejecting the
jurisprudence that courts should analyze a foreign country’s laws, the
Seventh Circuit essentially expanded the grave risk of harm defense by
removing an extra barrier to that defense.184 Previously, under
American jurisprudence not only would an abductor parent have to
prove a grave risk of harm to the child, but also that the child could not
be adequately protected by the laws in the country of habitual
residence.185 By eliminating this extra step, the Seventh Circuit has
broadened the scope of the grave risk of harm defense.186
C. Undertakings are inappropriate in cases of domestic violence.
Unlike the Sixth and Second Circuit’s analysis, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that undertakings may not be appropriate in cases of
domestic violence.187 The First Circuit also held that undertakings
would not mitigate the grave risk of harm to the children in Walsh
because there was no guarantee that the husband would adhere to
them.188 The Seventh Circuit again agreed with the First Circuit and
further explained, “in cases of child abuse the balance may shift
against return plus conditions.”189 While some circuit courts seem to
182

Id.
Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
184
See id.; see also Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
185
See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001);
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. TiceMenley, 58 F.3d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1995).
186
See Morley, supra note 5, at 1.
187
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571-72; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286
F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2002).
188
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000).
189
Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572.
183

728
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

accept undertakings as a valid remedy, the Convention does not state
anything about undertakings or that they may be appropriate in order
to effectuate a remedy of return.190 However, there is some argument
that, although undertakings are absent in the Convention, they have
become part of customary international law, as evidenced by the court
rulings that apply them, thereby making them legally valid
remedies.191
Undertakings, however may be ineffective and have international
enforcement problems.192 First, there is little evidence undertakings
will deter spousal and child abusers.193 Studies on the dynamics of
battering show that court orders have little deterrent effect.194 A court
order or undertaking does not guarantee the safety of the victims for
the same reasons that adequate laws do not – abusers do not always
follow laws or court orders, and punishment after-the-fact does not
negate the grave risk of harm to the children.195 In addition to
problems in effectiveness, undertakings also have international
enforcement problems.196 Once an abuser leaves the country that
issued the undertakings, the undertakings will not be enforced unless
the abuser travels to a country that specifically accepts them.197
Because undertakings are not in the language of the Hague
Convention, not every country recognizes them.198 Also, there is no
central agency that is commissioned to monitor the enforcement of
190

See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195-96; see also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 21
(“the concept of ‘undertakings’ is based neither in the Convention nor in the
implementing legislation of any nation”).
191
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195. (Customary International law is a type of
law with two characteristics 1) where it is practiced over time as evidenced by court
rulings applying accepted treaties and legislations and 2) where there is evidence of
opinio juris “the idea that such state practice is legally mandated).
192
Id. at 196.
193
Id. at 198.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.; see Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002).
197
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 198.
198
Id. at 198-99; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 23.
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undertakings or to monitor children altogether after they are returned
to the country of habitual residence.199 Essentially, issuing
undertakings and analyzing the adequacy of a foreign countries and
laws are similarly problematic—neither ensure that a child will be
protected before the child is abused.200
Undertakings, like analyzing a foreign country’s laws, also
undermine notions of international comity.201 By issuing undertakings,
an American court will directly be telling another country how to
structure its family law policy.202 Even more so than simply evaluating
a foreign country’s laws, undertakings usurp the laws of the country of
habitual residence by telling the country specific legal steps it needs to
take upon return of the child.203
The Seventh Circuit, in particular, seemed concerned with the fact
that to adequately protect a child from potential abuse, courts would
have to adopt extensive undertakings.204 The Seventh Circuit
specifically noted that extensive undertakings would entangle the court
in the merits of the underlying custody dispute, while the Hague
Convention prohibits such an entanglement.205 Second, extensive
undertakings would “dilute the force of the Article 13(b) exception.”206
Allowing the remedy of return when there is a grave risk of harm
defense, so long as there are adequate undertakings, goes against the
intent of having defenses to the remedy of return.207
By rejecting the notion that undertakings are appropriate in cases
of domestic violence, the Seventh Circuit again expanded the grave
199

Hoegger, supra note 9, at 199.
See id. at 198, see also Weiner I, supra note 3, at 679.
201
See Daniapour, 286 F.3d at 23; Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202.
202
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25 (where the
court reasoned that notions of International comity were violated where the district
court issued undertakings with the expectation that the “Swedish court would simply
copy and enforce them”).
203
Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25.
204
Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2005).
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195.
200
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risk of harm defense under the Hague Convention by eliminating
another barrier.208 The Seventh Circuit also promoted the notion of
preserving comity among countries, by suggesting that extensive
undertakings are inappropriate because they undermine and usurp the
laws of foreign countries.209
D. The Second Circuit set the bar too high for
a grave risk of harm defense.
While the Second Circuit in Blondin, did find that there was a
valid grave risk of harm defense, the court’s ruling was too narrow.210
Specifically, the court found that there was a grave risk of harm only
because the children would suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder
from merely returning to the country of France and the court limited
its holding to the facts of the case at hand.211 The Second Circuit still
held that it was valid to look at the adequacy of the child protection
laws in the petitioning parent’s country and to look at the possibility of
“extensive undertakings.”212 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Van de
Sande, on the other hand, properly recognizes that the grave risk of
harm defense extends to many circumstances (including domestic
violence), not just the narrow situation of post-traumatic stress
disorder.213
As the First Circuit noted in Walsh, the Hague Convention
provides for defenses to the remedy of return.214 The Second Circuit,
however, limited the defense to a unique fact pattern.215 Further, the
208

See Morley, supra note 5, at 7.
See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25.
210
See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 189; see also Weiner I, supra note 3, at 660209

61.
211

Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 163.
213
Compare Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir.
2005), with Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163.
214
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 222 (1st Cir. 2000).
215
See Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163.
212
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Second Circuit still considered possible undertakings.216 The Seventh
Circuit takes a more reasonable approach to the grave risk of harm
defense, instead of improperly limiting it to such a narrow set of
circumstances.217 While the grave risk of harm defense is a limited
defense, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the limited defense
includes cases of domestic violence.218
E. Criticisms of expanding the grave risk of harm defense
Some courts and scholars are concerned that by expanding the
grave risk of harm defense, although benefiting individual children,
may undermine some of the important policy considerations
underlying the Hague Convention.219 For example, expanding the
grave risk of harm defense will ultimately mean that a child’s physical
and psychological well-being will be raised in Hague Convention
proceedings.220 Courts are concerned that by analyzing a child’s
physical and psychological welfare they will in effect be making a
custody determination.221 However, a Hague Convention proceeding is
not supposed to be used for the court to make any determination of
future custody of the child—it is merely supposed to determine which
country has jurisdiction to make the custody determination.222 Looking
at whether there is a grave risk of harm to the child, however, does not
necessarily mean that courts will be making a custody
determination.223 The Convention specifically allows for the grave risk
of harm defense; therefore, under the narrow circumstance of this
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defense courts must look to the well-being of the child.224 Thus, courts
can and should look at the well-being of children within the context of
this defense, which does not constitute a custody determination.225
Some other concerns that courts have with expanding the grave
risk of harm defense is that it may take more time to litigate Hague
Convention proceedings and there is more possibility for abuses of the
defense.226 First, if parents see that a grave risk of harm defense is
successful in negating the remedy of return, they may raise it in all
Hague Convention proceedings, regardless of whether domestic
violence has actually occurred.227 Also, Hague Convention
proceedings will be lengthened if courts are required to delve into
facts regarding domestic violence and potential harm to the child.228
While expediency is important in Hague Convention proceedings,
ensuring children are not exposed to harm should outweigh concerns
that proceedings will take more time.229
Finally, courts are concerned that expanding the grave risk of
harm defense will violate notions of international comity because it
will appear as if American courts are making judgment calls about a
foreign country’s ability to protect children in cases of domestic
violence.230 If a court determines that there is a grave risk of harm to
the child and refuses to return the child to the country of habitual
residence, it still sends the message that the country of habitual
residence has not and will not adequately protect the child.231
Specifically the Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention noted
that if the defenses to the Convention are regularly invoked, the entire
224
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structure of the Convention would collapse because it would be
deprived of the “spirit of mutual confidence.”232 However, courts
violate notions of international comity more by analyzing a foreign
country’s laws and by issuing extensive undertakings.233 When a court
analyzes a foreign country’s laws it is directly critiquing those laws—a
gross violation of international comity.234 Also, when a court issues
undertakings it is directly usurping a foreign country’s laws,
substituting its own judgment for that of the foreign country.235 These
types of analysis violate comity more than merely looking at the harm
to the child and denying the remedy of return.236
Finally, expanding the grave risk of harm defense is arguably in
direct contrast to the theory that courts are to narrowly interpret the
defenses under the Hague Convention.237 According to the U.S. State
Department the express purpose of the Convention is to return
abducted children to the country of habitual residence, thus, any
expansion of the grave risk of harm defense arguably undermines this
purpose.238 However, the Convention explicitly allows courts to
suspend the remedy of return in cases where there is a grave risk of
harm to the child.239 Some circuit courts narrowed the defense so
much that it would be nearly impossible to prove a grave risk of harm
to the child (i.e. only in cases of “war, famine, or disease”).240 Also,
circuit courts narrowed the defense by adding extra factors to prove a
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grave risk of harm that are absent in the Convention.241 Specifically, a
parent would have to prove that the laws of the country of habitual
residence were inadequate and that undertakings would be
ineffective.242 By narrowing the defense to this extent, circuit courts
went well beyond the express language of the Convention.243 In Van de
Sande, the Seventh Circuit, although expanding the defense in
American jurisprudence, recognizes the proper scope of the grave risk
of harm defense in the context of the Hague Convention.244
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Van de Sande represents a
growing trend in American jurisprudence to expand the grave risk of
harm defense under the Hague Convention.245 Specifically, the
Seventh Circuit has rejected the legal doctrines of courts evaluating
the law of the country of habitual residence and issuing
undertakings.246 By eliminating these types of legal analysis, abductor
parents in Hague Convention proceedings only need to prove a grave
risk of harm to the child, not the inadequacy of a foreign country’s
laws or the inadequacy of undertakings.247 The Seventh Circuit has
also made a grave risk of harm defense possible in cases of spousal
abuse by recognizing that spousal abuse can harm a child
psychologically and potentially physically because of the greater
likelihood that a spousal abuser will also abuse the child.248
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The Seventh Circuit has also properly preserved comity among
nations in Hague proceedings.249 When courts analyze the laws of the
country of habitual residence or issue undertakings, they are
undermining a foreign country’s laws.250 One of the fundamental
purposes of the Hague Convention is to prevent this; thus, the Seventh
Circuit is promoting interests of international comity.251
In the past, the circuit courts placed the policy considerations of
narrowly interpreting the Hague Convention over the well-being of
individual children by overly limiting the grave risk of harm defense
through such barriers as evaluating the laws of the country of habitual
residence and issuing undertakings.252 In Van de Sande the Seventh
Circuit properly placed children first by restoring the grave risk of
harm defense to its proper scope under the Hague Convention.253
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